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SELF-REGULATION AND APPROACHES TO MAINTAINING
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY
STANLEY S. ARKIN*

The article presents an examination of self-regulation in the
legal community. The disciplinaryprocess employed by one judicial district in New York City is utilized as a model for examining
procedures and provides a basis for offering suggestions for upgrading effectiveness. The problems inherent in the selfregulation of the legal profession are examined from both the
practitionerand the lay viewpoint. After focusing on the objectives of self-regulation, the author suggests two important areas
of concern-disorderin the courtroom and the "marginalpractitioner." The article concludes with several suggestions for reforms in the areaof self-regulationincluding: stiffer requirements
for admission to the bar; the extension of legal aid and no fault
concepts; the increased use of small claims courts; the necessity
for continuing legal education courses in substantive and ethical
areasof law; and the necessity for law schools to devote more time
to the ethical considerations of practicing law. In addition Mr.
Arkin suggests that client security funds be established, that a
mediation procedure should be implemented and that grievance
procedures become more centralized.
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INTRODUCTION

The practice of law in the United States is one of the few professions which largely regulates itself. Minimum educational requirements set by lawyers must be met by new members of the profession; a formal and comprehensive Code of Professional Responsibility has been drafted by the American Bar Association and adopted
by most state bar associations as the guide to acceptable conduct
by lawyers; and most states have disciplinary machinery administered by practicing lawyers for dealing with attorneys whose professional conduct or ability to continue to practice has been questioned.
Because of an all too small and consistently dwindling public
confidence in the legal profession'-certainly due in some measure
to the Watergate scandals-it is more important than ever before
that self-regulation appear effective as well as be effective in maintaining high professional standards and responsibility.
Using as a model the disciplinary processes utilized by one
judicial district in New York City, this paper examines such procedures and offers suggestions for generally upgrading and increasing
their effectiveness. In addition, other means of securing professional
integrity and enhancing public confidence in the competence and
integrity of the bar are explored.
II.

WHAT IS SELF-REGULATION?

Self-regulation is not unique to the legal profession. Most professions have some form of internal regulatory mechanism for judging their members, but have retained less control over those procedures than has the legal profession. For example, although internal
control of the medical profession is largely in the hands of doctors,
review in many states is given to agencies and boards with lay
members. Yet in malpractice lawsuits the standards by which a lay
jury measures a doctor's negligence are generally far less strict than
those by which charges of an attorney's incompetence are judged.'
1. In a Harris Survey released October 6, 1975, only 6 percent of those questioned stated
that they had a great deal of confidence in law firms as an American institution; in 1974, the
figure was 18 percent; and in 1973, 24 percent.
2. See D. HARNEY, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973); A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
335-73 (1975); KLEIN, COMPLAINTS AGAINST DOCTORS: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
(1973); C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (4th ed. 1976); Haughey, Lawyers' Malpractice:
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Similarly, the conduct of police agencies has been increasingly subjected to civilian review.3 In the securities area, lay juries have been
permitted an ever expanding role in regulatory control over brokers
and dealers for violation of laws, SEC regulations, and even the selfregulatory rules of the exchanges.'
With respect to self-regulation in the legal profession, the bar
imposes disciplinary sanctions against lawyers whose misconduct
falls into three categories: (1) conduct prosecutable as a criminal
offense, and thus subject to the sanctions of the criminal justice
system; (2) conduct giving rise to traditional civil remedies such as
malpractice, 5 breach of contract, suits for equitable accountings,
Comparative Appraisal,48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888 (1973); King, Legal Malpractice The Coming Storm, 50 CALIF. ST. B.J. 363 (1975).
3. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 200 (1967). See ABA, THE URBAN POLICE FUNCTION 144-70 (1972);
Locke, Police Brutalityand Civilian Review Boards:A Second Look, 44 J. URB. L. 625 (1967);
Schwartz, Complaints Against the Police: Experience of the Community Rights Division of
the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1023 (1970); Weiler, "Who
Shall Watch the Watchmen?" Reflections on Some Recent Literature About the Police, 11
CRIM. L. Q. 420 (1969); Note, The Administration of Complaints by Civilians Against the
Police, 77 HARV. L. REV. 499 (1964); Comment, Police Disciplinary Procedures:A Denial of
Due Process, 7 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. AND PROC. 111 (1973); Comment, Reviewing Civilian
Complaints of Police Misconduct - Some Answers and More Questions, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 89
(1974).
4. See generally J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Van Gemert v. Boeing, 520
F.2d 1373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975); Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co.,
358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512
(E.D. Pa. 1946); Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules, 66 COLUM.
L. REV. 12 (1966); Note, PrivateActions as a Remedy for Violations of Stock Exchange Rules,
83 HARV. L. REV. 825 (1970); Comment, Implied Civil LiabilityArising From Violation of the
Rules of the NationalAssociation of SecuritiesDealers, 8 LOYOLA U. L. REV. (L.A.) 151 (1975);
Comment, Civil Remedies and Stock Exchange Rules - An Emerging Concept of Implied
Liability, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 551; Comment, Civil Liabilitiesfor Violation of NASD Rules: SEC
v. First Securities Co., 121 U. PA. L. REV. 388 (1972); 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1336 (1964).
The development of the law in this area is somewhat predictive of what may occur in
other "self-regulated" areas. The courts have held that the securities industry has been
allowed to regulate itself by rule, and where it has failed in such regulation, not only have
the individual offenders been held liable but the stock exchanges themselves (which are in
charge of such regulation) have been held civilly liable for their dereliction. In the unlikely
event that this reasoning were applied to the legal profession, the bar associations could
conceivably become liable for damages caused by an attorney whom they should have disciplined.
5. See generally Gillen, Legal Malpractice, 12 WASHBURN L.J. 281 (1973); Haughey,
Lawyers' Malpractice: A Comparative Appraisal, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 888 (1973); King,
Legal Malpractice The Coming Storm, 50 CALIF. ST. B. J. 363 (1975); Rothstein, Lawyers'
Malpractice in Litigation, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. No. 2, 1 (1972); Wallach & Kelly, Attorney
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and civil contempt; and (3) professional misconduct or inadequacy
not rising to the level of actionable civil or criminal charges.
In the first two categories a determination of misconduct is
typically not made in the first instance by the self-regulatory agencies, and any sanctions imposed by the bar are in addition to those
which may be imposed by the courts. Only in the third category is
the determination of possible misconduct and the corresponding
sanctions solely a self-regulatory matter. Accordingly, selfregulation is not as broad as the phrase might indicate.
Self-regulation in this third category involves determination of
standards for entering the profession, judging applicants by those
standards,' establishing an ethical code of conduct for practicing
members of the profession, and judging members by that code.7
A variety of disciplinary mechanisms are involved. In some
jurisdictions there have been battles between the legislature and the
courts' as to who should determine ethical standards and who
Malpractice in California:A Shaky Citadel, 10 SANTA CLARA LAW. 257 (1970); Comment,
Legal Malpractice, 27 ARK. L. REV. 452 (1973); Note, Legal Malpractice-Is the Discovery
Rule the Final Solution?, 24 HASTINGS L. J. 795 (1973); Note, Standard of Care in Legal
Malpractice, 43 IND. L. J. 771 (1968); Note, Attorney's Negligence, 5 LINCOLN L. REV. 154
(1970); Comment, Legal Malpractice in Mississippi, 43 Miss. L. J. 691 (1972); Comment,
Attorney's Negligent Failure to Comply with Procedural Deadlines and Court Calendar Orders -Sanctions, 47 TEX. L. REV. 1198 (1969); Comment, The State of Legal Malpractice in
Oklahoma, 9 TULSA L.J. 129 (1973); Note, Improving Information on Legal Malpractice, 82
YALE L. J. 590 (1973).
6. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 162 n.1 (1966);
JACKSON, CHARACTER REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (1951); Dershowitz, Preventive
Disbarment: A Critique of the ABA Proposal to Design Tests Capable of Predicting Misconduct Among Lawyers, 1966 (unpublished, Harvard Law School); Note, Admission to the Bar
- "Good Moral Character" - Constitutional Protections, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1008 (1967); 106
U. PA. L. REV. 753, 755 (1958).
7. See generally Carlin, supra note 6, at 150; GARRETT, A REPORT BY JUSTICE: COMPLAINTS
AGAINST LAWYERS (1970); 0. PHILLIPZ & P. MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS: A STUDY
OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, DISCIPLINE AND DISBARMENT (1972); ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT

(Final Draft June 1970) [hereinafter cited as

CLARK REPORT].

8. It is submitted that the role of the court in imposing and enforcing disciplinary
sanctions is within the concept of "self-regulation." The bench is certainly a part of the bar
(whether elected or appointed), although somewhat detached from the day-to-day concerns
of practicing lawyers.
Judges, too, as a part of the profession (as well as being public officials) are (with the
exception of federal judges who are subject only to impeachment and internal discipline by
their brothers) subject to self-regulation. Thirty-eight states currently have commissions on
judicial conduct. FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY STATE COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL CONDUCT
[New York] (1975) [hereinafter cited as FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION].
The image of the bench and bar is as one in the eyes of the public, and discipline of errant
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should be in charge of disciplining lawyers.' In most jurisdictions,
however, the courts have ultimate control over imposition of sanctions with some legislatures requiring certain discipline in particular cases."'

In most states, however, the implementation of the regulatory
mechanism is in the hands of bar associations. Some states grant
authority to local bar associations to process complaints, conduct
investigations, hold evidentiary hearings, and make recommendations to a statewide grievance committee. In other states the local
bar groups have the authority to recommend disciplinary action
directly to the court, which typically appoints a hearing examiner
or selects certain of its own members to hear the case.
Essentially then, the local bar associations serve a screening
function." Complaints may be dismissed or a lawyer censured
(usually non-publicly) and the matter terminated. However, the bar
association may refer the matter to the courts where generally there
will be a hearing de novo by a court-appointed referee with the court
judges is at least as important as that of errant practitioners. But this problem is somewhat
outside the scope of this paper, and accordingly, is mentioned only in context. However, it is
a problem of growing concern, and more attention is being focused upon it.
In New York, for example, the legislature established the "Temporary State Commission
on Judicial Conduct" in 1974 to investigate complaints of judicial misconduct and initiate
investigations on its own motion. An amendment to New York's Constitution which would
create a permanent commission on judicial conduct with power to commence removal proceedings and authority to suspend, publicly censure, and retire a judge for disability, subject
to the judge's right to a hearing before New York's Court on the Judiciary, was approved by
the State's voters on November 4, 1975.
Recently, also in New York, the Court on the Judiciary confirmed a referee's finding that
Wilfred A. Waltemade had been guilty of judicial misconduct while a State Supreme Court
Justice in New York and Bronx Counties. The confirmed report found that the judge "frequently subjected litigants and their attorneys to completely unwarranted abuse that was
often violent, occasionally hysterical, and usually degrading and demeaning." N.Y.L.J., October 28, 1975, at 1.

9. See, e.g., 0.

SCHROEDER, LAWYER DISCIPLINE: THE OHIO STORY

1-23 (1967).

10. In New York, for example, conviction of a crime designated a felony under New York
law mandates automatic disbarment. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
With respect to convictions of non-felony crimes, an attorney may not relitigate the issue
of his guilt during disciplinary proceedings, but may introduce evidence in mitigation and
explanation. See Levy v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 333
N.E.2d 350, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1975).
11. See, e.g., CHICAGO COUNCIL OF LAWYERS, REPORT ON DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES FOR
PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT

(1972); Note, DisciplinaryEnforcement Problems and Recommen-

dations: An Indiana Survey, 46 IND. L.J. 134 (1970); Comment, The Clark Report and the
Revised New Mexico Disciplinary Procedures, 2 N. MEX. L. REV. 292 (1972); Comment,
Proceduresfor DisciplinaryAttorneys in Virginia, 29 WASH. LEE L. REV. 439 (1972).
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reviewing the referee's determination and then imposing punishment. The power to suspend or disbar is universally reserved to the
courts.
III.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES EMPLOYED BY THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

New York's Judiciary Law section 90(2)"2 delegates the power
"to censure, suspend from practice or remove from office any attorney and counsellor-at-law admitted to practice who is guilty of professional misconduct, malpractice, fraud, deceit, crime or misdemeanor, or any conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice"
to the Appellate Divisions of each judicial department. 3 Section
90(7) of the Judiciary Law 4 authorizes the Appellate Divisions to
designate a district attorney within a department, or any other attorney and counsellor-at-law "to conduct a preliminary investigation and to prosecute any disciplinary proceedings .
The Appellate Division for the First Department 5 has issued
"Rules Governing the Conduct of Attorneys" which apply, inter
alia, "to all attorneys. . . admitted to practice, or who have offices
in" the First Department." The First Department's rules provide for
the court's appointment of a "Departmental Disciplinary Committee" which "may be a grievance committee of a recognized bar
association, and/or another existing or specially created disciplinary
agency or committee."' 7 The Departmental Disciplinary Committee
appointed by the First Department is currently the Committee on
Grievances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,"8
which is "charged with the duty and empowered to investigate and
prosecute matters involving alleged misconduct by attorneys."' 9
12. N.Y.

JUDICIARY LAW

§ 90(2) (McKinney 1968).

13. New York State is divided into four judicial departments, each of which has an
intermediate appellate court-the "Appellate Division." N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW §§ 70, 71
(McKinney 1968).
14. Id. § 90(7).
15. The First Department consists of the Bronx and Manhattan.
16. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.1 (McKinney 1975).
17. Id. § 603.4(a).
18. Id.
19. Id. This section of the New York Court Rules specifies that from time to time the
Appellate Division may designate "the appropriate committees of the New York County
Lawyers Association and of the Bronx County Bar Association . . . to investigate and prosecute matters involving alleged misconduct of attorneys."
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The First Department has delegated to the Association of the
20
Bar the power to appoint a chief counsel and supporting staff
which investigates charges of professional misconduct and presents
evidence of misconduct to the Grievance Committee.2 '
Article XIX of the By-Laws of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York sets forth the operating procedures of the Grievance Committee. Briefly stated, if, following an investigation into
alleged professional misconduct, 2 either the Grievance Committee,
its chairman, vice-chairman, or chief counsel deems it a matter "of
sufficient importance," written charges are served on the attorney
concerned (the "respondent"). A written answer must be filed. An
evidentiary hearing 3 is then held by the committee. The respondent
must appear unless excused by the committee or its chief counsel,
and may be (and usually is) represented by counsel.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the committee may either
dismiss or sustain the charges, and as to any charges sustained,
either admonish the respondent or recommend that such charges be
prosecuted in the courts. 4 The committee must recommend court
prosecution in the First Department when it "determines that probable cause exists for the filing of disciplinary charges . . 5
If the committee recommends court prosecution, under the As20. Id.
21. Investigations may be commenced sua sponte or upon receipt of a written and signed
complaint by the Appellate Division or the Grievance Committee. Id. § 603.4(b).
22. The First Department Rules define "professional misconduct" as follows:
Any attorney who fails to conduct himself both professionally and personally,
in conformity with the standards of conduct imposed upon members of the Bar
as conditions for the privilege to practice law and any attorney who violates any
provision of the rules of this court governing the conduct of attorneys, or any
Disciplinary Rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as adopted by the
New York State Bar Association, effective Jan. 1, 1970, as amended, or any Canon
of the Canons of Professional Ethics, as adopted by such bar association and
effective until Dec. 31, 1969, or any of the special rules concerning court decorum
shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct within the meaning of
subdivision 2 of section 90 of the Judiciary Law.
Id. § 603.2. As for the other departments, the Judiciary Law contemplates that each Appellate
Division shall have power to say what constitutes professional misconduct within its department. Erie County Water Authority v. Western New York Water Co., 304 N.Y. 342, 107 N.E.
2d 479, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 892 (1952).
23. Witnesses and documents may be subpoenaed upon application to the Appellate
Division by the chairman of the committee or its counsel. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.5(a) (McKinney
1975).
24. Id.§ 603.9.
25. Id.§ 603.4(c).
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sociation's By-Laws a written report must be submitted to the Association's Executive Committee which must approve the recommendation.2 "
When public interest requires prompt action or when an attorney's conviction of a crime involves moral turpitude, the Executive
Committee can bypass the Grievance Committee procedure and
authorize direct court prosecution.
When disciplinary proceedings are instituted by the committee
in the Appellate Division, that court may "appoint a referee, Justice
or Judge to hold hearings or may discipline an attorney without
appointing such referee, Justice or Judge, on the basis of the record
of hearings before such committee." 7 If a hearing is conducted, the
referee, justice, or judge files with the court a report at its conclusion
setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Once the
hearing transcript and the report are filed, the court, upon motion
of either party or on its own, may confirm or disaffirm the report in
whole or in part, may make new findings with or without taking
further evidence, or may order a new hearing.2"
Thus, the findings and conclusions in disciplinary proceedings
are not strictly binding on the Appellate Division. The court must
itself decide whether or not the charges have been sustained.29 Although the hearing examiner's findings are entitled to serious consideration by the court, 0 it may, even on credibility issues, substitute its own judgment. 3
All grievance proceedings conducted by the committee and any
proceedings before the Appellate Division are private and confidential.3" However, "in the event that charges are sustained by the
justices of the appellate division . . . the records and documents in
26. The First Department Rules, however, make no provision for review by the Executive
Committee. Section 603.4(a) of the New York Court Rules specifically appoints the Committee on Grievances as the "Departmental Disciplinary Committee" and grants no authority
regarding disciplinary procedures to the Association's Executive Committee.
27. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(c) (McKinney 1975).
28. N.Y.R. Civ. PPAc. 4403 (McKinney 1963).
29. See, e.g., In re Broome, 13 App. Div. 2d 657, 213 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822, rev'd on other'
grounds, 10 N.Y.2d 942, 179 N.E.2d 942, 224 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1961).
30. In re Gondelman, 258 App. Div. 1085, 18 N.Y.S.2d 52, modified on other grounds,
259 App. Div. 889, 20 N.Y.S. 2d 410, aff'd, 285 N.Y. 624, 33 N.E.2d 553 (1941).
31. See, e.g., In re Kahn, 38 App. Div. 2d 115, 123, 328 N.Y.S.2d 87, 95-96, aff'd sub
nom., 31 N.Y.2d 752, 290 N.E.2d 435, 338 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1972).
32. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 1968); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK BY-LAws art. XIX, 115.
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relation thereto shall be deemed public records." 3
Section 90(8) of New York's Judiciary Law provides for an
appeal as of right from a final Appellate Division order in a disciplinary proceeding "upon questions of law involved therein," subject to certain limits on the appellate jurisdiction of the New York
Court of Appeals contained in the New York Constitution, Article
6, Section 7. Otherwise, appeal is by permission of the Appellate
Division or the Court of Appeals.3"
IV.

EFFECTIVENESS OF BAR ASSOCIATION GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

The grievance mechanism of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, while admirable, has serious inadequacies. Indeed, the Association's Executive Committee has established a Special Committee on Grievance Procedures to study existing problems
and to make recommendations.
In a study of the City Bar's grievance procedures, sociologist
Jerome Carlin concluded:
Very few violators are caught and punished .

. .

. [o]nly

about 2 per cent of the lawyers who violate generally accepted
ethical norms are processed, and fewer than 0.2 per cent are
officially sanctioned. ....

.1

Although some debate may be had with Carlin's figures, there
is no doubt that many violators of the Code of Professional Responsibility"6 and those guilty of ethical and criminal violations are not
disciplined. The number of complaints handled by the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York has increased consistently over
the past decade.3" However, the vast majority of the increase in
violations has come in two areas which did not, in the eyes of the
Grievance Committee, call for disciplinary action-complaints
against attorneys outside the Committee's jurisdiction and comJUDICIARY LAW § 90(10) (McKinney 1968).
34. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 5602(a) (McKinney 1963).
35. J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 170.
36. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (Final Draft July 1969) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PROFESSIONAL

33. N.Y.

RESPONSIBILITY].

37. Categories of Complaints Received by Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Grievance Committee, by 2 year periods:

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:803

plaints which set forth no unethical behavior." The complaints re37. (Cont.)
OFFENSES AGAINST
CLIENTS
DIRECT OFFENSES AGAINST
COLLEAGUES
INDIRECT OFFENSES
AGAINST COLLEAGUES
DIRECT OFFENSES AGAINST
THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE
INDIRECT OFFENSES
AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
OTHER PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT
NON-PROFESSIONAL
MISCONDUCT
CRIME
MISCELLANEOUS
COMPLAINTS AGAINST
ATTORNEYS OUTSIDE
COMMITTEE'S JURISDICTION
COMPLAINTS WHICH SET
FORTH NO UNETHICAL
BEHAVIOR
TOTAL COMPLAINTS

1975-74

1973-72

1971-70

1969-68

1967-66

1,183

1,180

1,512

1,560

1,090

59

59

67

74

73

37

34

26

22

36

22

15

27

22

29

141

118

185

146

125

98

170

112

219

136

95
66
17

241
53
17

180
96
25

799

609

447

441

1,881

1,925

1,530

1,410

1,714

4,603

4,479

4,246

4,226

3,934

1,054

DISCIPLINARY ACTION TAKEN BY TWO-YEAR PERIODS
1975-74
REF. DIRECTLY TO
APPELLATE DIVISION
HEARINGS
LETTERS OF ADMONITION
TOTAL COMMITTEE
ACTION
DISBARRED
SUSPENDED
CENSURED
TOTAL COURT ACTION

1973-72

1971-70

1969-68

1967-66

38
60
212

46
84
275

22
88
328

24
101
318

20
92
106

311
31
34
14

405
28
18
5

427
14
17
2

446
23
22
5

206
26
7
6

175

150

101

110

88

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Grievance Committee Annual Reports for the years 1966-1975.
38. They include, for example, requests for advice, minor fee disputes, minor disagreements in personal business transactions, and minor disagreements not attributable to misconduct.

19761

SELF-REGULATION

mained constant for indirect offenses against colleagues,3" indirect
offenses against the administration of justice,'" crimes,4 and miscellaneous offenses.2 The number of complaints actually decreased for
offenses against the client,43 direct offenses against colleagues,4 4 direct offenses against the administration of justice,45 other professional misconduct," and -non-professional misconduct.47
Actions taken by the Committee have been at a fairly constant
level,4" maintaining consistency with the stable number of substantive complaints. Court actions such as disbarment, suspension, or
public censure, however, have grown rather dramatically.49 This
would seem to indicate a tougher attitude either by the Committee
through more zealous and effective prosecution or by the courts
through increased rates of conviction.
As a former member of the Association's Grievance Committee
and one who has represented fellow lawyers who have appeared
before it, this author believes the grievance procedures have had
some degree of success, and have acted as a significant deterrent to
misconduct. The Association expends considerable resources in
terms of time of its members, indicating a concern by the Bar to
regulate itself and promote high standards of professional conduct.
V.

SOME PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SELF-REGULATION

After an extensive evaluation of the disciplinary mechanisms in
existence during the later 1960's, the American Bar Association's
Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement
(The Clark Committee) ' " reported
39. E.g., solicitation, advertising, and fee splitting.
40. E.g., fraudulent representation, false swearing, actions in bad faith, abuse of process,
violation of court rules, and concealment of evidence.
41. E.g., larceny, forgery, perjury, bribery, and income tax evasion.
42. E.g., minor offenses such as disorderly conduct, violation of administrative codes,
etc.
43. E.g., conversion, overreaching, neglect, misinforming, conflict of interest, and fraud.
44. E.g., "personal relationships," agreements, and by-passing another attorney.
45. E.g., improper influence.
46. E.g., derelictions and non-cooperation.
47. E.g., financial irresponsibility and fraud.
48. The actual volume has been erratic, but no discernible trend is apparent. See note

37 supra.
49. Total court action (action taken and pending) has doubled in the last decade. See
note 37 supra.
50. CLARK REPORT, supra note 7.
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the existence of a scandalous situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession. With few exceptions, the prevailing attitude of lawyers toward disciplinary enforcement ranges
from apathy to outright hostility. Disciplinary action is
practically nonexistent in many jurisdictions; practices and procedures are antiquated; many disciplinary agencies have little
power to take effective steps against malefactors. 5
The Clark Report dealt with 36 problem areas and made recommendations for changes in the grievance procedures in each area.
Many of the current state disciplinary procedures reflect changes
instituted since that report was issued. However, many of the Clark
Report's recommendations have not been adopted, even by those
states that have generally attempted to remedy the problems enumerated by that report.
One problem area which was described in some detail in the
Clark Report is the "local and fragmented nature of the disciplinary
structure.''52 The Committee recommended "[s]tatewide centralization of disciplinary jurisdiction under the ultimate control of the
highest court of the state." 3 The two main defects of a decentralized
structure are the actual presence of, or the appearance of, partiality
when the disciplinary agency in a small community investigates
''one of its own''54 and the lack of uniformity between the various
jurisdictions within a state.5
A second problem is that the investigating and prosecuting
staffs of the disciplinary agencies are often inadequately trained and
prepared for their work. Work on such agencies requires special
training in professional ethics, custom, and usage as suggested in
the Clark Report.5" However, what is perhaps more urgently required is maturity and general lawyering experience. Just as the
intricacies of the legal profession present problems beyond the scope
of most lay people, they sometimes present problems that can be
understood only by people who are aware of the pressures on attorneys and the various alternatives available to them. Of course, it is
not suggested that all of the staff members of a Grievance Commit51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

1.
24-29.
24.
25.
25-26.
57-59.
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tee should be "senior" people, but a substantial number of top
people should be. When younger, more inexperienced lawyers are
given authority, they should be closely supervised and their work
carefully reviewed.
A basic affliction of the present system is the reluctance of
lawyers to report misconduct of fellow lawyers. 7 It is very difficult
for-any regulatory agency to effectively control the profession without extensive voluntary cooperation from lawyers. Many "offenses"
are participated in by the client and may become known only to
fellow lawyers.
Certainly lawyers have a professional and moral obligation to
assist the bar in its self-regulating effort. Indeed, the Code of Professional Responsibility makes it an affirmative duty of a lawyer to
"reveal voluntarily . . . all unprivileged knowledge of conduct of
lawyers which he believes clearly to be in violation of the Disciplinary Rules."" And Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) states: "A lawyer
possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102 shall
report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered
to investigate or act upon such violation."59
Yet it would be unseemly to suggest that lawyers abandon
discretion and judgment and basic human decency to become
avid informers on one another. On the other hand, if self-regulation
is to be effective, lawyers with unprivileged knowledge of professional misconduct must come forward or face disciplinary proceed57. J.
CITY 144

HANDLER, THE LAWYER AND

His

COMMUNITY: THE PRACTICING BAR IN A MIDDLE-SIZED

(1967).

The same problem was experienced by the New York Temporary State Commission on
Judicial Conduct with respect to the reluctance of "many attorneys ... to report injudiciousness" of judges. FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 9.
58. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-4. See also ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS No. 29; ABA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 11.
59. Emphasis added. DR 1-102 provides as follows:
A. A lawyer shall not:
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule.
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
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ings themselves in those cases where their own conduct amounts to
a "misprision." 0
A further flaw of the present system lies in the inadequate
representation of substantial segments of the bar on its grievance
committees. While there has been movement recently in New York
to rectify this problem, until recent years the composition of the
Grievance Committee was heavily tilted toward "Wall Street" lawyers. At present the Association of the Bar's Grievance Panel is
significantly represented by individual and small firm practitioners,
as well as by those who practice criminal law, matrimonial law, and
other small firm specialties.
The problems with this under-representation of certain segments was pointed out in the Clark Report:
(1) Disciplinary agencies composed of members who lack expertise in the fields of practice likely to be involved in the complaints
they are required to pass on, such as negligence and criminal law,
may be unable to evaluate the accused attorney's conduct intelligently.
(2) Effective self-discipline requires that all segments of the
profession actively support the disciplinary process. Practitioners
who are the subject of complaints and who find that the disciplinary agency is composed of attorneys unfamiliar with the
problems they face in their practice may feel that the propriety
of their conduct is not being reviewed by a panel of their peers.
This may lead to resentment of the disciplinary agency by a
substantial segment of the profession. "'
Carlin also points out that there are differences of opinion between various segments of the bar as to what standards to enforce:
While the more general standards are accepted by most lawyers
in all strata of the bar, the distinctively professional standards
[relation among colleagues, methods of obtaining business and
conflicts of interest] are accepted for the most part only by elite
lawyers. 2
60. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1970) which provides:
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable
by a court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make
known the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under
the United States, shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.
61. CLARK REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
62. J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 165.

19761

SELF-REGULATION

The "elite" or secure lawyers may simply be unaware of the pressures on lower strata lawyers. As Carlin stated:
[Llawyers at the top experience maximum pressure to conform
to distinctively professional standards, as well as the more ordinary, ethical norms; at the same time they are insulated from
pressures to violate. Conversely, lawyers at the bottom of the
status ladder are maximally exposed to pressures to violate, and
least subject to pressures to conform."3
To rectify this problem the Clark Report recommends an
"[i]ncreased emphasis by the appointing authority on including
single and small-firm practitioners, members of minority groups
and attorneys engaged in negligence and criminal law in the membership of disciplinary agencies." 4
The problem might be more effectively solved by having the
appointing authority set up grievance panels independent of organized bar associations and representative of a cross-section of practicing attorneys. Although the current rules in New York's First Department designate the City Bar Association's Grievance Committee as the "Departmental Disciplinary Committee" for the Department, the rule allows for the possibility of a "specially created disciplinary agency or committee." 5
Certainly a lawyer's clients, his specialty, or the location of his
office should not be considerations for disqualification of appointment to a grievance panel. The basis for individual appointment
should be excellence in practice and unimpeachable integrity. In
addition, the panel generally should be a representation of the entire
legal community.
Poor record-keeping by disciplinary agencies is epidemic. Oftentimes it is difficult to trace the path of current investigations and
complaints." A complaint otherwise not warranting disciplinary
procedures might be viewed in a different light by a grievance committee if the complaint represented a pattern of misconduct by a
particular lawyer.
Of great concern are the limited options open to a dissatisfied
client. Currently he can file a civil suit for damages or an accounting, or he can complain to the disciplinary agencies. But many
63. Id. at 168-69.
64. CLARK REPORT, supra note 7, at 46.
65. N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(a) (McKinney 1975).
66. CLARK REPORT supra note 7, at 77-81.
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clients might not want to have their lawyer "brought up on charges"
as much as they would like to have him answer some questions or
to have a dispute settled. The Grievance Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York handles many complaints which result
in little more than a correspondence with the lawyer instructing him
to call his client. These "complaints" are filed as such with the
Grievance Committee because the client has nowhere else to go.
Many of the disputes could be settled by mediation if such a body
were available. The New York County Lawyer's Association, for
example, has a mediation committee to arbitrate fee disputes.
Other problems which will not be discussed in any detail, but
which are persistent and difficult are: financing; time delays; 7 the
fact that few investigations are initiated without complaints; coordinating problems between different jurisdictions; and issues relating to the public disclosure of grievance proceedings.
VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS OF SELF-REGULATION

Disciplinary proceedings are "of a quasi-criminal nature""8 and
may result in the deprivation of a valuable property right and
privilege-a license to practice law and earn a living." Thus, disciplinary proceedings must provide the due process protections guaranteed by the constitution. As the Supreme Court stated in Johnson
v. Avery: "The power of the States to control the practice of law
cannot be exercised so as to abrogate federally protected rights."7 0
67. Aside from an inadequate or ineffectual staff or outright procrastination commonly
associated with any bureaucraticized institution, there are delays in grievance prosecutions
that are compelled by the existence of other pending proceedings against a lawyer and attendant constitutional and statutory safeguards.
The problem of the indicted lawyer is illustrative. However outrageous the alleged conduct is which results in criminal prosecution, the presumption of innocence, the privilege
against self-incrimination, and grand jury secrecy (and a prosecutor's natural, if not undesirable, reluctance to disclose his evidence before trial) all render a grievance proceeding extremely difficult if not impossible. The result is that an indicted lawyer, even though eventually convicted may have practiced years in the iterim between charges and disposition. But
cf. Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that testimony taken in a federal
grand jury investigation of an attorney could be made available by the federal court to a bar
association grievance committee considering charges against the attorney).
68. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 551 (1968).
69. See, e.g., Erdmann v. Stevens, 458 F.2d 1205, 1209-10 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. 393 U.S. 483, 490 n.ll (1969). See also Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness,
373 U.S. 96, 106 (1963) (petitioner denied due process when denied admission to the bar
without a hearing on the charges against him).
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In Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v.
Wadmond7' a three-judge federal court held that the Appellate Division judges could be enjoined in the federal court from enforcing an
unconstitutional state statute dealing with the bar.
The disciplinary procedures utilized in New York's Second Judicial Department (not significantly distinct from those of the First
Department) have been recently challenged on constitutional
grounds before a three-judge federal court in the Eastern District of
New York. 2 The major due process challenge in that case was based
on the application of section 90 of the New York Judiciary Law,"3
wherein the Appellate Division sits as a trier of fact. Specific objection was made because the trier determined the facts without hearing the witnesses and without an opportunity to determine their
credibility; denied an opportunity to orally argue the case; and was
not obligated to give reasons for its decision, even when rejecting the
report of the hearing examiner. Because section 90 also failed to
accord attorneys an appeal as of right to the Court of Appeals from
an adverse decision of the court of original jurisdiction (the Appellate Division), it was contended that the statute violated equal protection as well as due process rights.
Over the dissent of one judge who found persuasive the contention that the disciplinary procedure violates the due process and
equal protection clauses, the majority in Mildner v. Gulotta7 ' dismissed the complaints. The court held that the constitutional
claims had "no substantial merit" and that neither 42 U.S.C. §
1983 nor the court's constitutional question jurisdiction authorized
"an inferior federal court to pass upon the procedure employed by
the State courts to discipline attorneys who practice before them or
to interfere with their judgments in such matters.""5
71. 299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd on other grounds, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (The
court indicated that while it had the power to issue an injunction against the use of various
questionaires regarding the bar, it found "no immediate occasion for doing so." 299 F. Supp.
at 133).
72. Mildner v. Gulotta, 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
73. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 90 (McKinney 1968).
74. 405 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
75. Id. at 184. The case was brought under § 1983 as a civil rights action. The court
specifically held that § 1983 does not extend the right to litigate in federal courts evidentiary
questions which had been adjudicated on the merits in state proceedings upon the claim that
there was no evidence to support the state action. Plaintiff's attorneys had asserted that the
lack of evidentiary basis for the decision was itself a denial of due process or equal protection.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:803

The point is that there has been insufficient sensitivity to the
constitutional problems inherent in disciplinary procedures. Not
only are there the issues litigated in the Mildner case, but there are
questions relating to the standards of proof, the types of evidence,
the right to free counsel, and the right to a public hearing. Since
grievance proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, should not the
standard of proof be strict and as clearly defined as possible, such
as the "clear and convincing" standard? What of illegal evidence
such as unlawful electronic surveillance or other violations of the
fourth or fifth amendments? Some illegal evidence is admissible to
a federal grand jury, and indeed, may be highly probative. But is
such evidence a fair, just, and lawful basis for disbarment? Even
lawyers may be unable to afford adequate representation before a
grievance panel or a court-appointed referee.
The in camera nature of grievance proceedings also raises a
question. Recently, certain attorneys involved in a New York City
grievance proceeding requested a public hearing and were refused
that opportunity. In respect to certain segments of the bar engaged
in representing litigants involved in controversial causes, a public
hearing may be of crucial significance.
VII.

SELF-REGULATION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF STANDARDS OF

PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY: DISORDER IN THE COURTS AND THE MARGINAL
PRACTITIONER

A.

Courtroom Conduct

To a large extent the public's view of the bar is sculptured by
what it sees and hears of lawyers' courtroom conduct. By discussing
the question of disruptive courtroom conduct in the context of this
paper, it is not suggested ttat this problem occurs frequently. But
this class of conduct does have great impact on the image of the bar.
One of the reasons put forth for the apparent increase in disruptive activity by defense counsel is that "many lawyers representing
public interest or politically radical clients have too strong an emotional bond with them and lack the detachment necessary to perform the lawyer's function."7 6 In such circumstances there may be
a tendency to react more personally to adverse actions by prosecutors or judges, and to be overcome by frustration caused by per76. N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT 135 (1973).
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ceived or real injustices. It has been suggested that discipline by
self-regulatory mechanisms is a way of dealing with this problem.
Traditionally, American lawyers are more concerned and involved with social and political issues than are lawyers elsewhere.
Even in England, for example, the organized bar (composed of
about 2,000 barristers) resembles a club, and has "remoteness from
the concerns and passions of ordinary life." 77 This may be the reason
for the fact that so few lawyers are ever disciplined for misbehavior
in the English courts.7
By contrast, American lawyers are more passionate about many
of the important cases that they argue. Anthony Lewis explains:
Because the function of the American lawyer is different, he cannot be expected to have the same degree of detachment. Perhaps
in theory one ought to be able to argue a case about the fourteenth amendment and capital punishment with the same detachment as one about a commercial contract. But in the real
world, lawyers who are engaged in great social and political issues
must be more committed than would be appropriate in the
Strand. I do not regret that. I feel as Professor Benjamin Kaplan
of Harvard evidently did after a year in London observing that
legal system. "The American scene is disordered," he wrote, "but
it is lively.""
It is strongly submitted that the bar and the public need to
develop more tolerance to such reactions. While disruptive courtroom tactics, moments of outrage, and deliberate confrontations
cannot be condoned, they should be viewed in perspective. Certainly any increase in sensitivity which helps a lawyer better understand the needs of his client is a positive development. Personal
identification, to the extent that it helps a lawyer better represent
his client, should not be needlessly discouraged. Sir Thomas Erskine, the great English barrister, said in 1792 during his defense of
Thomas Paine for seditious libel:
If an advocate entertains sentiments injurious to the defence he
is engaged in, he is not only justified, but bound in duty, to
conceal them; so, on the other hand, if his own genuine sentiments, or anything connected with his character or situation, can
77. Lewis, Lawyers and Civilization, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 862 (1972).
78. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 141.
79. Lewis, supra note 77, at 863.
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add strength to his professional assistance, he is bound to throw
them into the scaleX0
Despite all the attention devoted to forensic conduct, there is
comparatively little discussion about what a lawyer may or may not
do in the courtroom. Indeed, the Code of Professional Responsibility
has only one disciplinary rule dealing with trial conduct.X' The fact
is that proper rules of professional courtroom conduct are for the
most part undefined. Most courts assume that lawyers should know
what they may properly do. Mr. Justice White of the Supreme Court
80. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 136, quoting 22 HOWELL'S ST. TR. 414 (1792).
See also Comment, ControllingLawyers by Bar Associationsand Courts, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTSCiv. Lia. L. REV. 301, 333 (1970).
81. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106, Trial Conduct provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client to disregard a standing rule
of a tribunal or a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding, but he
may take appropriate steps in good faith to test the validity of such rule or ruling.
(B) In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a lawyer shall disclose:
(1) Legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to him to
be directly adverse to the position of his client and which is not disclosed by opposing counsel.
(2) Unless privileged or irrelevant, the identities of the clients he
represents and of the persons who employed him.
(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall
not:

(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to
believe is relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other
person.
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except when
testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as
to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect
to the matters stated herein.
(5)

Fail to comply with known local customs of courtesy or practice

of the bar or a particular tribunal without giving to opposing counsel
timely notice of his intent not to comply.
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence.
The Canons of Professional Ethics, which were in effect until 1970 when the American
Bar Association adopted the Code of Professional Responsibility, dealt almost entirely with
attorney's conduct in impending or ongoing litigation. Only one of the 47 canons spoke
directly to "Professional Advocacy Other than Before Courts."
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expressed the prevailing point of view in a case involving out of
court conduct by a lawyer:
[M]embers of a bar can be assumed to know that certain kinds
of conduct, generally condemned by responsible men, will be
grounds for disbarment

. . .

all responsible attorneys would rec-

ognize [certain conduct] as improper for a member of the profession."
In some ways it is paradoxical that a profession that insists
upon the need for definitive rules to regulate other people's conduct
has generally failed to establish rules to regulate the conduct of its
own members in court. But there is something to be said in favor of
the absence of defined rules. Many lawyers have different styles of
presenting a case. They may question witnesses, submit their evidence, cross-examine, or argue to the judge in a variety of ways.
Telling a lawyer exactly how he must perform in court may impose
too great a restriction on his performance since situations may arise
that require unorthodox responses. Therefore, a lawyer should be
given some leeway in the vital task he is performing.
There are two methods currently used to deal with misconduct
in the courtroom: the contempt citation and discipline by bar associations. Suffice it to say that there have been some over-reactions
to attorneys' conduct in the courtroom that are honest responses to
perceived injustices.
The tolerance suggested for the self-regulatory process should
be communicated in a responsible and thorough manner to the public so as to avoid undue negative impressions of the bar caused by
this sort of conduct.
B.

The Marginal Practitioner

A second problem is the role of the marginal practitioner. Carlin describes him as follows:
Lawyers with low-status clients tend to have an unstable clientele; that is, they have a higher rate of turnover in business and
individual clients. .

.

. Lawyers with low-status clients also re-

port more competition from other lawyers in obtaining clients,
and that they have been hurt by such competition. This reflects
82. DORSEN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 76, at 139, quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 555
(1968) (White, J., concurring).
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the weak and intermittent demand for legal services from lowerstatus clients, the relatively large number of lawyers whose practice is restricted to such clients, and the many nonlawyers who
are willing and able to perform similar services often at a lower
price.
Insecurity of practice leads to violation of basic bar norms
83

In addition to the fact that temptations and opportunity for ethical
violations are higher among marginal practitioners, those attorneys
are more prone to make mistakes because of the large volume of
cases they must carry to survive. The sheer magnitude of their case
loads may lead them to overlook certain aspects of each individual
case.
Much grievance committee work has to do with the misconduct
of the marginal practitioners. Such misconduct is typically of a
"petty type" involving the inexpert handling of a case, disputes over
fees or problems with solicitation. However vigilant grievance procedures might be, the enormous pressures on the marginal practitioners coupled with the lack of a stable, prideful association to the
profession are circumstances which preclude significant deterrents
to sloppiness, "corner cutting," or conduct "unbecoming a member
of the bar."
A related problem, of course, is that many people can afford no
other type of attorney. In other words, a fairly sizable segment of
our society must turn to marginal practitioners for legal advice.
One solution to this situation is the elimination of the need for
this kind of practitioner. If "free" legal advice were available, or if
matters could be handled by the individual himself without resort
to an attorney, many of the problems with marginal practitioners
would disappear (along with many of the marginal practitioners).
Steps are being taken in many jurisdictions which in effect implement this type of proposal, including expansion of legal aid services
to cover larger segments of the population, introduction of no-fault
insurance in the negligence area, and increased receptiveness
through small claims courts of "litigation without lawyers."
An elimination or substantial reduction in marginal practitioners, in addition to reducing the number of offenses lawyers commit
against clients, would free the disciplinary agencies for other work,
83. J. CARLIN, supra note 6, at 66-68.
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such as increased independent investigations, and thus generally
increase public confidence in the profession.
VIII.

THE PROBLEM OF "SELF" IN SELF-REGULATION

Shakespeare, Dickens, or someone with great perception but
little charity towards our profession might insinuate that selfregulation is a bit like the fox watching the chicken coop. It is
submitted, however, that this is not the case. Disciplinary proceedings essentially determine one thing-the fitness of an attorney to
continue the practice of law, not whether the attorney as an individual has transcended the rules of proper conduct which bind all
society.
Very few, if any, seriously suggest that the standards of ethicality and competence for law practice should be determined solely by
lay people. 4 While bar exams and admission standards have been
criticized,85 such criticism has been based on their content and not
because the standards for admission are set by lawyers. The same
expertise required to determine who is intitially fit to practice law
is needed to determine who is no longer fit to practice.
Likewise, no one suggests that determination of the fitness of a
person to be a medical doctor should be made solely by lay persons.
There are certain types of knowledge and skill a physician must
possess and other physicians are best equipped to set the standards
by which they are judged. Similarly, while legal knowledge is not
directly analogous to some of the technical aspects of medical
knowledge, lawyers also receive training in and utilize a highly specialized form of knowledge. Judging a lawyer's capacity to use such
knowledge competently and ethically requires an insight into law
that most lay people do not possess.
Interestingly, as of 1970, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas
permitted lay jury trials in disciplinary proceedings. The Clark Report recommended the elimination of such a practice8 6 and noted
that, at least in Georgia where an accused attorney may elect a jury
trial, no such request has ever been made.87 The conclusions of the
Clark Report were as follows:
84. Interestingly, the New York legislation which created the Temporary State Commission on Judicial Conduct requires at least two lay people to be members of the Commission.
FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 1.
85. See generally note 6 supra.
86. CLARK REPORT, supra note 7, at 136.
87. Id.
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In order to evaluate charges of professional misconduct properly, the trier of fact should be familiar with the practices peculiar to the profession. Conduct involving, for example, complicated real estate transactions, conflicts of interest, advertising,
and confidential communications cannot be evaluated readily by
laymen totally unfamiliar with the concepts underlying the standards set forth in the Canons of Professional Ethics and Code of
Professional Responsibility. Trial by a jury of laymen may mean
that the accused attorney is judged by different standards than
those the profession has required of him. This may inure as much
to the accused attorney's benefit as to his detriment. For example, a jury of laymen unfamiliar with the abuses that necessitate
the prohibition against improper solicitation may exhibit their
hostility to a standard they do not understand by exonerating the
accused attorney.
The possibility of a jury trial, which in fact is little availed
of, serves only to delay and weaken effective disciplinary enforcement.""
Additionally, inclusion of lay persons in the regulatory process
might raise serious constitutional problems. Analogously, there is
recent authority holding unconstitutional a process where a nonlawyer judge is permitted to sit on criminal cases.s"
Finally, it must always be remembered that where substantial
rights of third parties are involved, other actions, both civil and
criminal, are available.
Indeed, when re-examining some of the shortcomings of the
current disciplinary processes previously discussed, it is clear that
the problems stem from regulation of a profession such as law rather
than the self-regulating aspect of such regulation. To take some
specific examples, look at failures of lawyers to report the misdeeds
of fellow lawyers. Given this inclination, lawyers are no more likely
to voluntarily cooperate with newspaper people, government
agencies, or citizens groups than they are to do so with bar association grievance committees. If methods can be developed to increase
the "reporting" done by lawyers, such developments would be advantageous to a self-regulatory or non self-regulatory process.
88. Id. at 136-37.
89. See Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 938 (1975); North v. Russell, appeal docketed 44 U.S.L.W. 3028 (July
22, 1975).
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It is submitted that lawyers investigating other lawyers does
result in an independent investigation. Lawyers are a contentious
profession, and while there is great pride in being a member of the
bar, it would be grossly naive to compare the brotherhood of lawyers, such as it is, to one of the more nefarious brotherhoods which
infect our society.
Some contend that no lawyer is going to go out of his way to
prosecute a fellow lawyer. This may be a valid criticism in small
communities where discipline is often a part-time job scattered
among various practicing lawyers in the community, all of whom are
close personal friends. But if the value of self-regulation is truly
being measured, a fairly modern, up-to-date system should be examined. The investigating and prosecuting lawyers for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York are, in many cases, committed to a career in such a job. It is not the case of a lawyer investigating a fellow lawyer with similar interests, but rather a person whose
very job is investigating the conduct of practicing lawyers. Furthermore, one need only look to the statistics of the Association of the
Bar's Grievance Committee to come away with the certain conclusion that lawyers are capable of doing justice to their brethern.
IX.

SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM

Certainly if the quality and competency of the bar were raised
generally, there would be fewer disciplinary problems. In discussing
the problem, one would be remiss in failing to suggest that if stiffer
requirements existed for admission to the bar, both ethically and
intellectually, there would also be a resulting diminution of marginal or intolerable practitioners. Again, the expansion of legal aid
and no-fault concepts and the increase of small claims courts for
situations where lawyers are not required contribute to an environment which should discourage the continued existence of many
practitioners whose practice spawns disciplinary problems. The goal
is not a reduction in the overall number of lawyers, but instead to
place a greater emphasis on quality and to redistribute some of our
legal resources to agencies such as legal aid or public defenders.
Law schools can and must play a greater role than most presently do in imbuing future lawyers with a sense of ethics and a
commitment to the profession. Continuing education of lawyers is
an obligation of the organized bar. Perhaps as a condition of retaining one's license to practice law there should be a requirement that
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all members of the bar demonstrate their own continuing legal education.
Maintaining a high ethical standard requires two things: the
fear of quick and sure punishment for violation of ethical standards,
and a knowledge and understanding of those standards. " If selfregulation, or indeed any form of regulation of the profession, is to
be effective there must be a large number of lawyers who follow
ethical guidelines simply because they will be punished for violating
them.
Federal Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New
York is of the view that students begin developing ethical standards
in law school,9' and they pick up much of their ethical guidance from
their professors whether the professors intend to give such guidelines
or not.92
To the extent that violations of the Code are the result of ignorance about the specifics and interpretations of the Code, law school
can do much to educate students, and thereby affect their behavior
as lawyers. However, to the extent that violations occur because of
a "flaw in the moral fiber" of the lawyer, ethics courses will likely
be unsuccessful.
Nonetheless, continued work in developing effective methods of
imparting some form of knowledge and sense of ethics among law
students is highly recommended. The American Bar Association
recently adopted new rules which require law students of accredited
law schools to take a course on the Code of Professional Responsibility as a prerequisite to graduation. But ethics and professional responsibility cannot be taught in a vacuum. As Judge Irving R. Kaufman, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, wrote:
But the separation of ethical from substantive and procedural questions must inevitably yield a one-dimensional view of
the realities of day-to-day lawyering. I am constrained to agree
with the observation of one commentator that "the place to teach
90. Wright, Self-Discipline of the Bar: Theory or Fact?, 57 A.B.A.J. 757 (1971).
91. Weinstein, On the Teaching of Legal Ethics, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 455 (1972).
92. Id. at 456.
93. See, e.g., FIRST REPORT OF THE TEMPORARY COMMISSION, supra note 8, at 21; Smedley,
The Pervasive Approach on a Large Scale:--"The Vanderbilt Experiment", 15 J. LEGAL ED.
435 (1963); Van Hecke, Educationfor Professional Responsibility, 17 LA. L. REV. 513 (1957);
Weckstein, Perspective Courses and Co-CurricularActivities, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 398 (1969).
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ethics at the law schools is not in special courses, but in every
course offered." 4
A second role education plays relates more to "poor performance" by attorneys rather than unethical behavior. No lawyer can
be expected to keep up with all the details of ever changing case law,
especially a lawyer who works in fairly broad categories. But there
is no excuse for a lawyer to "forget" that a witness to a will should
not be a beneficiary,95 or that certain causes of action have restricted
time periods for filing.9" There can be no excuse for a lawyer to take
a case in an area in which he has no expertise (a fact which the Code
of Professional Responsibility recognizes). 7 By requiring lawyers to
keep abreast of new events and trends, we can minimize to some
degree the level of incompetence that exists within the profession.
The concern shown by the California Bar for continuing education
exemplifies these points.9"
Client "security funds" are a necessary concomitant to selfregulation. If the bar wishes to be responsible for regulating the
conduct of its members, there must exist a concrete vehicle evidencing in a material sense the bar's collective responsibility for a lawyer's misfeasance.
New Zealand established the first reimbursement practice in
1929.11 Queensland, Australia, followed in 1930, and Alberta, Canada, in 1939. Shortly thereafter, England and South Africa provided
similar methods to protect clients. As of 1968, 19 countries had
adopted variations of the plan. 10 Although there was some consideration for such a plan in Oklahoma as early as 1953,1"1 it was not until
1959, when Vermont instituted such a plan, that the United States
had a jurisdiction that so protected clients. 12
Lawyers who object to client security funds see compensation
to clients for unethical behavior of lawyers as "someone else's business." Unfortunately, if the profession does not regulate itself legal
94. Kaufman, The Law, SATURDAY REV., Nov. 1, 1975, at 17.
95. See M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 69, 74-75 (1968).
96. See generally id.
97. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 6-101.
98. Proposed California Plan for Maintenance of Professional Standards, 6 ALI-ABA
CLE REV. 1 (1975).
99. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, LAWYER INDEMNITY PLANS 14-15 (1955).
100. M. BLOOM, supra note 95, at 29.

101. Id. at 20-30.
102. Id. at 30.
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malpractice may become an increasing phenomenon. If the medical
profession is any guide as to what will happen to the legal profession, these lawyers will be paying for other lawyers' mistakes in the
form of insurance premiums. A client security fund has the advantage of being cheaper to operate because no profit factor for an
insurance company need be included. Moreover, the profession
could establish some degree of control over the criteria for, and
amount of such awards, a function which would be assumed by
courts and juries under malpractice suits.
One common suggestion is that the staff of disciplinary agencies be of a higher caliber. Lawyers who work for disciplinary committees should be held in higher esteem and compensated accordingly.
As far as possible, grievance procedures should be centralized.
Because of the negative impact that local and fragmented procedures has had on actual discipline and on the public's perception
of the profession, any hint of impropriety must e avoided. Indeed,
the very words "self-regulation" imply a protective, self-serving
scheme. That image must be avoided. Having a lawyer in a community with only 20 lawyers subject to regulation by the other 19
will not avoid producing such an image. Every complaint received
should be reviewed by a state-wide grievance panel before it is
turned down or prosecuted and before any publicity is released.
A serious problem is the fact that a good deal of misconduct
goes unreported. Therefore, the effectiveness of the complaint procedure must be increased. Clients, who are the largest source of
complaints, may be unaware of grievance procedures and can not
be charged with knowing what constitutes misconduct.
More publicity of grievance procedures is one way of letting the
public know that there is a forum for complaints and that complaints are dealt with seriously. The shroud of secrecy surrounding
grievance proceedings for protection of an attorney's reputation can
and should be maintained by omitting names and addresses in news
reports, much like the procedure utilized in reporting news of court
proceedings involving juveniles.
Additionally, the complainant should always be informed of the
progress and disposition of a grievance proceeding he has commenced against a lawyer. Often, charges of misconduct are dismissed and the complainant is never informed. Such a practice
cannot serve to engender a public trust in the self-regulatory process.
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Moreover, other sources of information should be developed.
District Attorneys' offices and public defenders who are in court
daily must be sought out by grievance committees to cooperate in
reporting misconduct. Grievance committees must also be receptive
to leads from news articles raising questions of misconduct.
Finally, a mediation organization should be established and
made available to clients for informal disposition of complaints not
amounting to professional misconduct or inadequacy. There should
be some place a client can go without necessarily accusing his lawyer and turning the lawyer-client relationship into an unduly hostile
one. Of course, any settlement reached through such mediation
should not be allowed to interfere with, or be considered a substitute
for, discipline where appropriate.
If the history of other professions is any guide lawyers have no
choice. Lawyers must effectively regulate themselves or others will
step in.
PANEL DISCUSSION

The following excerpts are taken from the panel discussion
which followed the paper presented by Mr. Stanley Arkin.
In addition to Mr. Arkin the panel consisted of Mr. Harvey
Levin, an instructor of law at the University of Miami who served
as the moderator of the panel; Mr. Edward Atkins, who has recently
served as vice-chairman of The Florida Bar Special Study
Committee on Long Range Reorganization of Grievance Procedure,
and is currently a member of the Board of Governors of the Florida
Bar and president-elect of the Florida Bar; Mr. Clarence Jones, an
investigative reporter for station WPLG-TV in Miami; Mr. Larry
Jinks, executive editor of the Miami Herald; the Honorable Alan
Schwartz of the 11th Judicial Circuit Court Dade County, General
Jurisdiction Division, who also serves as a Florida Bar disciplinary
referee; and Mr. Burton Young, past president of the Florida Bar
and recent chairman of The Florida Bar's Special Study Committee
on Long Range Reorganization of Grievance Procedures.
MR. LEVIN: Mr. Arkin has identified a number of issues relating to self-regulation and the purpose of this panel discussion is to
dispose of and develop the sources of conflict in the area of the selfregulation debate.
There are three principle sources of self-regulation that we will
be discussing. They are (1) the confidentiality in the disciplinary
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process; (2) lay participation in the disciplinary process; and (3)

whether members of the bar can and should regulate themselves.
With respect to the first source of conflict, confidentiality in the
disciplinaryprocess, a central issue is determiningat what level the
disciplinaryprocess should be opened up to the public. Many states
now keep matters confidential until the issue comes before the supreme court of the state. That is under review now by various state
bar associationsas well as by the American Bar Association. Judge
Schwartz, would you comment on the issue of at what point the
disciplinaryprocess should be opened up to the public?
JUDGE SCHWARTZ:
My opinion is that at the very least, confidentiality should terminate at the time that probable cause is
shown for the prosecution of the attorney in question. I can see no
justification whatsoever for drawing any distinction between disciplinary matters against attorneys and criminal proceedings against
attorneys and others. The distinction between those two situations
which now exists is indefensible. The only basis upon which it can
be defended and the one upon which the public regards it as being
defended is that the bar has the authority to make its own rules with
respect to its own members. This is a general view in this field and
I think a well justified one. However, the confidentiality provision
of the bar regulation must yield at that level.
MR. YOUNG:
I think you have to examine the reasons why
confidentiality should be retained or waived. We have a serious
problem in America today. People generally do not believe in lawyers, do not believe in courts, and do not believe basically in the
system of justice. They do not think justice is being dispensed fairly.
I think it is up to the legal profession to take the extra step in trying
to show the public that the profession is, in fact, doing the job of
self-regulating, and that the lawyers, at least in Florida, are making
a concentrated effort to do their job. The problem is that no one
knows about it except the lawyers that are involved in the program.
The question is: Since we are doing the job, why must we expose so much to so many? The reputation of the lawyer is the only
thing he has. Unfortunately, when you go public even the guy who
gets acquitted may have his reputation ruined. I think Mr. Arkin
expressed that view.
But the greater question is the maintenance of public confidence, and I think that lawyers may need to surrender certain personal rights in order to instill such confidence. My opinion is not
shared by the majority of Florida lawyers or by the Board of
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Governors of The Florida Bar. However, the committee that I was
involved with very recently proposed that confidentiality indeed be
waived following a finding of probable cause at the grievance committee level in matters involving major misconduct. If that finding
is concurred in by a reviewing member of the Board of Governors
and by staff counsel and there is no objection by the lawyer, the
matter should be made public. If there is an objection, there is a
right of immediate review. There will be problems of course with
regard to the lawyer who is wrongfully charged. That is a price I
believe we have to pay. We are in a quasi-public business and must
recognize that the only thing that is going to separate us from tyranny and preserve democracy is the legal profession. When the people get sufficiently fed up, they are going to change the system. We
can not afford to run that risk.
MR. ATKINS:

First of all, let me point out if I may, that when

Burton Young said that the Board of Governors of The Florida Bar
does not agree with what he said, he meant the majority does not
agree, not all of them. Basically, Burton and I agree with regard to
the stage at which confidentiality should be waived, assuring the
necessary safeguards to the members of the profession and also assuring the public by telling them that which, in my judgment, they
have a right to know.
We have got to start off with the recognition that we are a
service profession. As a service profession, those that we serve have
a right to expect competent legal services ethically rendered. They
have a right to be assured that we are doing the job which we are
supposed to do. The time has passed when proof of this is going to
be achieved simply by reiteration that we at the bar are doing a good
job. It is an absolutely justifiable inquiry on the part of the public
to make sure that our grievance machinery is viable and effective.
The public should be in a position where they can judge this for
themselves. They simply cannot do so if we continue to hide it under
a basket someplace and ultimately tell them they have to accept our
word for it. I think confidentiality should be waived under the circumstances where the safeguards are there, such as was proposed
before the Board of Governors.
MR. JONES:
As an investigative reporter, many of the people
who call me are people who think they have been screwed by a
lawyer, and who feel that the bar is not disciplining that lawyer. It
is a very difficult kind of case to investigate. It is one of the most
frustrating that I deal with, and it occurrence. Someone comes in,
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probably on an average of once a month, to say that he has in some
way been misrepresented by a lawyer. Sometimes he has been to the
bar association and he does not know if the bar association has done
anything about it or not. I do not know whether the bar disciplines
its own. I do not think any of us do because they will not let us see
what goes on inside. That is the real problem here.
If you have a licensed profession that deals with rights that are
so sacred in our society, how is one to know whether the man who
is licensed to represent his client does a good and honest job? There
are atrocious stories in this state and in every state, not only with
the handling of criminal and civil cases, but also with the disciplining of lawyers. There was a time when certain attorneys would not
even file a written brief when representing other lawyers who had
charges filed against them. They were sure they had won the case
before it was even argued. In my opinion the bar has for too long
considered itself an aristocracy.
All of these questions revolve around the central issue of how
public the disciplinary process is. No matter what is done in secrecy,
the public will never be convinced of its effectiveness because they
cannot see what is being done. With some reservations, I advocate
making the process public from the filing of the initial complaint.
We have to have a system to tell the public when complaints
are filed and provide them with the bare essentials of the allegations.
One idea for disciplinary proceedings is similar to the British
system where the public would know that a complaint has been
filed. They would not know all the details of the complaint, but
would simply know at the initial stage that the complaint is there,
and that the bar is supposedly acting on it.
Another step would be when filing the complaint, the allegation
in the complaint would have no libel privilege. The public and the
press could see the complaint, but if the press then published or
broadcast the allegation in its full detail, it would have no privilege
for that publication. The press would have to prove what it printed
or broadcast is true until the point where probable cause is established. I believe that all of the ills that effect disciplinary proceedings can in some measure be solved by opening them up to the
public.
MR. JINKS: I was talking to somebody before this session
began, and said that I felt a little bit as if I were an independent
who had been invited to participate in a discussion of the secret rites
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of a social fraternity. The bar is not a social fraternity of course, and
that is why we are here talking about this.
As Mr. Arkin spoke I wrote down that what he seems to be
saying to laymen is "trust us." I for one am not quite willing to
extend that degree of trust. I am also not quite willing to go as far
as Clarence Jones would advocate, although my tendency is to come
down hard on the side of complete opening of proceedings. It does
seem to me that there needs to be some kind of protection against
frivolous grievance. Perhaps Mr. Jones would say that there is a
kind of protection involved in making public the details of anything
that is frivolous. However, I certainly would agree with Judge
Schwartz, Mr. Young, and Mr. Atkins that there is a point within
the proceedings well before the conclusion where the whole proceeding should become public. That point is established by the finding
of probable cause.
If I understood Mr. Arkin correctly, he was saying that there are
times when clients who have filed grievances cannot themselves find
out what the disposition was. I think that is outrageous. As long as.
you have that kind of situation, the general attitude of the public
toward the legal profession is going to decline.
MR. ATKINS:

The policy of the Florida Bar is that a complain-

ing witness is to be notified with regard to the disposition of the
complaint that he has made. I think that is nothing but common
courtesy, and certainly is required when dealing with people who
come forward to make complaints.
MR. ARKIN:

I will comment a little on newspapers. There is a

lot to be said for what the press has done in this country and continues to do.
But I ask you, should there not be controls by an outside agency
as to what and how a piece of news is placed in the newspaper? I
am sure the newspaper people would say absolutely not. So take a
hypothetical situation where a complaint is received against a
prominent member of the Florida Bar. It may be unjustifiable, but
it is a complaint nonetheless. There would be front page coverage.
That certainly is not fair to the attorney just because he happens
to be more prominent and more newsworthy. This is a serious problem. Newsworthiness has nothing whatever to do with justice.
My suggestion is not that criminal proceedings should not be
equated with these quasi-criminal disciplinary proceedings. They
should be. But I would like to pull back from publishing all the gory
details of charges against an individual when he is charged with a
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crime. I have seen the absolute ruination of a human, his family,
and everything he does or stands for based on charges alone, even
if he is eventually vindicated or acquitted.
I am not in favor of complete secrecy. At an appropriate time
the information should be made public, and more regularly public
than is done now. For example, in New York, when somebody is
disbarred, suspended, or publicly censured, it is published in the
Law Journal, and hence is read by a very small percentage of lawyers. It is not put in the New York Times unless the attorney happens to be somebody very prominent.
I am not saying that having public scrutiny of proceedings is
not good. By and large I am in favor of it. I would like to see our
grand jury proceedings opened up to the public-terrible abuses go
on there. There are far more terrible abuses in our grand jury system
than ever can be conceived of in bar disciplinary proceedings. This
is because if the lawyer transgresses so far as to make it heinous,
misrepresentative, or ugly, he can be criminally prosecuted and
civilly sued.
These alternative remedies are available and they are public
and tough. The fact that in a typical grievance case we have proceedings in confidentiality until the point of disposition does not
affect those heinous cases. An individual has no redress against
publicity which is pursued without control or direction and may
forever harm and ruin that individual.
A compromise suggested is publicizing the proceedings at the
determination of probable cause. In effect, that means once it goes
beyond the screening procedure and has been reviewed, it should be
published. Although I find it hard to quarrel with that kind of decision in some respects, there remain serious problems. What probable cause means and how it is defined is a very difficult thing.
Probable cause presumably means it gets to a point where there is
clear and convincing evidence or substantial evidence, whatever
that means, as opposed to just some evidence. Perhaps it means
there is enough evidence to make it beyond a reasonable doubt, at
least without hearing the other side-a grand jury standard in some
states. Maybe that is enough. I do not know, but I am against the
airing of these kinds of proceedings, or any kind of accusatory
proceedings, until a point comes when we can be fairly sure that the
individual's rights will not be jeopardized by a false accusation.
I have had clients who were indicted on the front page, but
acquitted on page 66 or not at all. The Wall Street Journal or the

19761

SELF-REGULATION

New York Times would say to me that it is not newsworthy that he
was acquitted.
This is not an issue which can be decided easily in the the sense
that we must have it opened up in order to cure the sore. On the
other hand, I am not an advocate demanding that it must be kept
secret. I do not argue for the profession to the exclusion of decency
and civilization. But I am arguing that accusatory charges aired in
a newspaper or other public medium, without showing and proving
substantial justification for those charges, is an evil thing. If there
has been a whitewash, a bribe, a payoff, a handshake, or even a
lawyer who won a case without a brief, that is newsworthy. That is
corruption. But the charges themselves are not.
JUDGE SCHWARTZ: I will respond to that. What Mr. Arkin is
saying is that there is no distinction to be drawn between the freedom of the press as provided in the first amendment and the rights
of attorneys or of other accused persons-that if attorneys and other
accused persons are subject to regulation, then the press should be
regulated on the same basis. We can not accept that kind of equality
under our system and under our Constitution.
I will respond to it in another way, by assuming that there is
no such equality. The fact is that if someone who has an unjustified
grievance against a prominent member of the legal community goes
to the State Attorney instead of going to the Florida Bar-it is not
subject to any confidentiality.
The State Attorney presumably has thousands of complaints,
not only against attorneys but against everyone else. Of those
thousands, most never go any further, never see the light of day, and
are not reported in any way. When the State Attorney, presumably
acting in good faith, finds that there is probable cause or reason to
file that information, or take the case to the grand jury and secure
an indictment, the fact is that it is a matter of public notice whether
the defendant is an attorney or not. It is impossible for me to draw
any meaningful distinction between those two situations.
Finally, what we are talking about is at what level under our
grievance procedure confidentiality should terminate. I suggest that
the way to get at this situation is rather to scrap the entire procedure
we have now. This would eliminate the system under which lawyers
regulate themselves in the sense that they do now because I can not
see any justification for that system anymore than I can see justification for a system in which a panel of bartenders determines
whether a bar is going to lose its liquor license or not.
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I think that the system should be just as it would be in the case
of the regulation of any other profession. There should be a completely independent system in which there is a professional prosecutorial staff and administrative judges. If the attorney desires, perhaps he should have a jury trial. But the same system should operate in disciplining members of other professions, and also operate
within the criminal system.
MR. ARKIN: I agree with Judge Schwartz about an independent agency. Probably the only answer we have is to take it out of
a guild voluntary membership organization and put it into a state
agency.
However, Judge Schwartz appeared to come out exactly contrary to what I was suggesting before. We can equate grievance
proceedings with criminal proceedings and charges. However, rather
than that being the justification for having them aired in a newspaper, what I was suggesting was that the very fact that the criminal
proceedings are aired at the stage they are, and in the manner they
are by our newspapers, is objectionable and should be cured. Rather
than expand the press privilege to cover these proceedings, there
ought to be a severe contraction of the right to cover this kind of
accusatory proceeding.
MR. JONES: I think most of the abuses in famous cases were
abuses by lawyers and judges. It was the judge who held the press
conference and who called the press. It was the attorneys who leaked
their sides of the case. Perhaps what we need in terms of pre-trial
publicity is more bar control over the lawyers, rather than bar control over the press.
MR. YOUNG: The public does not know whether the bar is or
is not capable of disciplining itself, monitoring its conduct, or maintaining the quality of the performance of the profession. Everything
is confidential. If they knew that the bar was doing its job, if they
were able to sit there and see what goes on in the referee's hearing,
I think that would eliminate the problem. But the public does not
know what is going on. I think that if the process opens up, and if,
indeed, it is shown that we are not regulating ourselves, if we are
ripping off the public, then there is a reason for having others judge
our ethical properties and perhaps our level of competence.
Until that time comes, however, I am not willing to allow a
layman to determine whether I should have returned a telephone
call to a client or whether I should have filed a motion to dismiss
rather than a motion to strike, and am therefore, not competent in
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the manner in which I practice law. I think to permit this would be
basically wrong. No one would stand for having a layman determine
whether a person is qualified to enter the practice of law or determine which academic courses should be taken before one can be
admitted to take a bar examination. I do not think a layman is
competent to determine whether a lawyer has breached the Code of
Professional Responsibility or whether he has acted incompetently.
I do think that laymen should be part of a review program to
determine every few years whether our disciplinary program is
operating and functioning properly. The Florida Bar adopted such
a program several months ago. Every several years there is going to
be a commission composed of laymen and lawyers to review whether
our disciplinary program is working. But you must take one step at
a time. I think when we open the process up the public is going to
be quite satisfied to see that the job is being done properly.
MR. ATKINS:

It may help to set some parameters. To begin

with, there is no question but that the legal profession (actually the
supreme court has the authority and lawyers are the agents through
which the court operates to do the ultimate disciplining) has the
competency and the integrity to do the job and to do it properly.
I honestly cannot conceive that the best interests of the public
or the best interest of the profession can be served by the legal
profession being under the aegis of the Board of Business Regulation, along with the cosmetologists, the barbers, etc. In essence that
is what I understand Judge Schwartz to be suggesting here. If he is
not suggesting that, then at least that is what was suggested by a
senator from the central part of the state. Whether such responsibility should continue with the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar
or whether it should reside with a disciplinary board which is also
under the direction of the supreme court is a good question.
With the work of the Board becoming as extensive as it is, I
think there is merit to at least considering the possibility of setting
up a disciplinary board which would be responsible to the supreme
court for the handling of disciplinary problems here in Florida.
A free and independent judicial system is vital to our democratic system. It must have lawyers functioning in it, and it is inconceivable that in the final analysis we can continue to do that if we
are going to be subjected to constant scrutiny and disciplining by
an outside force.
I wonder if we are not approaching the entire concept somewhat
inaccurately, especially in this particular day and time. Mr. Arkin
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commented upon this and he is right to a certain extent. We have
in our disciplinary program a two-pronged objective. One is to monitor the conduct of the attorney. The second is to maintain the competency of the bar. Constantly the focus has been on monitoring the
conduct. There is no question that with the advent of the Code of
Professional Responsibility promulgated in Florida in 1970, the primary thrust now is not just a matter of monitoring conduct, but
rather competency. We did not have appropriate disciplinary measures in the canons. Now we do. I am leaning toward the viewpoint
that we should start placing greater emphasis on our program with
regard to competency of the lawyers in various phases. Perhaps we
ought not start viewing our entire procedure as one not so much of
discipline, but rather one of lawyer-qualification.
MR. JONES:

We agree on one thing. I think lawyers are the best

judges of lawyers' competence and of their ethics. But unless the
public gets an opportunity to see what the lawyers do in judging
other lawyers, there will still remain the possibility of a "fix" and a
suspicion throughout the public that the "fix" is in.
MR. ATKINS:

I think that everybody here, including Mr.

Arkin, agrees that a basic proposition centers around the public
knowledge of what is going on. Those of us who are concerned with
the process and have dealt with it are convinced that it is working
out well. But like justice, it can be the best in the world, and if the
people do not see that justice is done, they are just not going to
believe it. Until they see that our system is an effective, viable
system they are not going to have faith in it. In the final analysis
we all agree that the people are entitled to a greater measure of
information with regard to what we are doing so that they can judge
for themselves.
JUDGE SCHWARTZ:
Perhaps the greatest argument against selfregulation of the bar and for the idea that the bar is in effect a guild
system, is the fact that, despite Mr. Atkins' obviously correct statement that everybody here agrees with the proposition that there
should be a termination of confidentiality at a given point, many
or most members of the Florida Bar do not share in that view and
it is not the position that has been accepted by the Board of Governors of the Florida Bar. The apparent reason for this, and I surmise
this on the basis of reading the material that was sent out in support
of the opposite position, is to protect the lawyers against the public.
As a matter of fact, we are supposed to protect the public from
ourselves. What right do we have to do that?
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I do not like the idea of subjecting lawyers to lay boards to
determine whether they acted competently. It is not a realistic proposition. But aside from our feeling that we do not want to be with
the cosmetologists, nobody has asked the cosmetologists whether
they want to be with us. Aside from that fact, how can one theoretically justify the bar's present position without saying that we are
better than they are or we want to be regulated only by ourselves?
How can that be justified on any viable, conceptual, theoretical
basis?
MR. LEVIN: Mr. Jinks, do you think administrative law
judges or lawyers could do enough to restore the viability of our legal
.system?
MR. JINKS: I think there should be some lay participation in
the grievance process. I do not understand that process well enough
to say precisely how it should function. However, it seems to me that
there probably is a middle ground between the positions that I have
heard here.
MR. ARKIN:

Lay people could be better lawyers than some

lawyers, many lawyers. There is nothing special in terms of intrinsic
intelligence or judgment to being a lawyer. What I was suggesting
in my opening remarks was that judgment on any particular issue
is a philosophical concept which is better enhanced by knowledge.
Knowledge is a general thing. The best lawyers in my view are
lawyers who do not just read cases, but read books, know people,
and participate in activities aside from the narrow activities of certain kinds of lawyers. The more information you have, the better
judgments you can make. We are talking about a very specialized
area with subtle judgmental decisions to make. In my view those are
the kinds of lawyers who should sit on those kinds of panels.
On the other hand, the answer could be, and I have not heard
it, that if you have five lawyers and two lay people, cannot the
lawyers discuss with the lay people the legal issues and inform them
as judges instruct juries? Intelligent lay people can understand. We
have lay people judging the medical profession. But what is the
benefit? What is the point? Is it just image? Because somehow
people believe there is no whitewashing if you have a couple of lay
people on a panel? The next step would be to ask whether there
should be two lay people and five lawyers or five lay people and two
lawyers.
MR. LEVIN: Mr. Arkin, if civil juries are capable of handling
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fraud cases why cannot they handle commingling of fund cases
when the attorney is the one subject to the charge?
MR. ARKIN: That is a very good point. First, in terms of selfregulation lay people do have an immense input. We have not had
that mentioned. If a lawyer files a complaint after the statute of
limitations he could be sued for malpractice. That is a lay person
making a public complaint in a civil forum to be judged by his peers.
A client can also make a criminal complaint. A large portion of a
lawyer's conduct is subject to lay influence and judgment.
We have juries who are able to decide complicated fraud and
anti-trust cases, or who serve in federal criminal cases which are
extremely complex. Given these facts why cannot or should not
laymen be used for lawyer disciplinary proceedings? It is hard to
answer the question. I suppose the best answer would be that the
jury system only works well in certain kinds of cases. It does not
work well across the board. Nobody will say to you that a jury can
judge all cases. I believe in the jury system, but I also believe it has
defects. It has impairments and disabilities and it cannot be used
in all cases. In the normal grievance case I do not think we need it.
I am really not against having certain lay people in on the
process. It really makes no difference because they become our
friends anyway, but I think the kinds of judgments that have to be
made are better made by lawyers.
QUESTION: I would like to suggest an answer as to why the bar
would like to regulate itself. It is a closed monopoly in that entry is
controlled by determining who can practice the law. Once they get
there and make a mistake, who judges them? There is mediation
short of court proceedings. Lawyers judge them. They do not make
the charge public. It has been said by a number of people that codes
of professional responsibility are nothing but anti-competitive restraintsof trade. Dentists do not testify againstdentists, etc. I suggest to you, and I agree with Judge Schwartz, that we should open
this up to the public because there is no incentive for a lawyer to
bring an action against another lawyer. Who is the best judge? Is it
not the publica*dnd courts?
MR. ARKIN:

All lawyers are not the same as all other lawyers.

That is the nature of our profession, so that when you are getting
one lawyer to judge another lawyer you are getting another human
being who is especially able to do that.
As far as the monopoly aspect of the profession, are you suggesting that we elect lawyers-that within our communities we have a
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panel of nominees for lawyers as they do in China where they elect
peoples lawyers? There may be some virtue to that. I am not quarreling with it to a bottom line point, but I do not think we have
reached a point in society where we have the commune gathered
together and we select someone to be our advocate. We do not do it
that way. We have to have special knowledge and special qualifications.
QUESTION: For the purpose of my question, I am addressing
myself solely to those issues which would not be legitimate ones for
court proceedings. Your analogy between the legal profession and
other endeavors is logically appealing, but I question whether we
should make a judgment solely on the basis of an analogy, because
we are subject to a tautology there. I question whether we should
not focus more deeply on the competency of the judge and the
lawyer in these minute legal areas. It takes 3 years in law school to
gain even the slightest measure of competent thinking. I question
many areas of technical competency of lawyers. Can we delegate
those kinds of questions to laymen? I also wonder what you would
have to say to the additional expense of educating, instructing, and
funding a lay board to make such determinations?
I am sure I was guilty of either not making
JUDGE SCHWARTZ:
myself clear or not saying what I meant. I tried to suggest that the
parade of "horribles" that Mr. Young had presented here was just
that. There are no disciplinary proceedings, nor have there ever
been, nor will there ever be, relating to a claim that a lawyer filed
the wrong pleading or made a mistake in one of those particular
areas of the law.
Mr. Atkins was just stating that he did not think that the bar
was doing enough as far as the provision of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires that a lawyer be competent. What he
is talking about is lawyers whose lack of competence boggles the
mind. He is not talking about or will he ever talk about lawyers who
file wrong pleadings. This is not a viable issue to be decided.
Let us assume that the accused lawyer has been before a grievance proceeding or an administrative judge or a panel including lay
people and such a charge is made. As in the criminal court, there
would be a directed verdict or a dismissal. That is exactly what
would occur in such a situation. It would never be a problem.
QUESTION: Are you saying that in terms of lawyers' technical
competency no such question would ever come before a grievance
committee?
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JUDGE SCHWARTZ:
If we are using the term "technical," in the
way that I think you are, then I would say yes.
QUESTION: I mean, for instance, whether a lawyer violated the
Rule Against Perpetuitiesin drafting a will?
JUDGE SCHWARTZ:
Absolutely not.

QUESTION:

If a lawyer failed to file a complaint within the

statute of limitations,for instance? We can go on and on because if
you are saying that such questions will never come before a board
of grievance, I question whether we have not just damned ourselves
to the public?
JUDGE SCHWARTZ:

There are other means besides grievance

proceedings in order to detect and eliminate lawyers who write wills
which violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, or allow statutes of
limitations to run out. When a lawyer lets the statute of limitations
run because he has a problem in his office and does not go into the
office or does not return phone calls for 2 years, that is not a technical matter of the law. If there is a question of whether the law of
Vermont or the law of New Hampshire applies in very technical
situations and a lawyer makes a determination that one does rather
than the other and is wrong, and as a result the statute of
limitations has run, that will not be subject to grievance procedure
as long as there is some good faith in a decision like that.
There are alternative measures, such as malpractice actions, as
Mr. Arkin said. Very often in cases such as these you could not get
past a directed verdict in a malpractice case, let alone in a grievance
proceeding.
MR. YOUNG:
Let me respectfully disagree. First, I think we are
going to be in trouble if we do not direct ourselves in our grievance
procedure more to matters dealing with incompetence. We never
could do that before, but now we can.
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibilities says that
a lawyer is charged with acting competently. True, it is not used
very much, but it is going to be used a great deal more. It is going
to be a question for discipline as compared to that of malpractice
because there is no room in this profession for "dummies" when the
public is being hurt.
Competency is interwined with self-regulation. There are two
aspects to self-regulation: One is competency and the other is ethical transgression. It used to be you had to file a malpractice case in
competency matters, but now we have the tools for grievance actions and they are going to be used.
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In Florida we are spending hundreds of thousands of dollars a
year in our grievance programs, and thus we are going to be more
and more involved with the competency aspect. That is why I think
it would be inappropriate and unjust to involve laymen as judges
in these particular matters at this particular level. However, as we
suggested before, laymen do have a right to see that we are doing
our job.
QUESTION: I would like to make one observation, and ask a
couple of questions. First,after having practiced law for many years
and having served on the grievance committee of the Florida Bar
for a long period of time, my experience with the grievance committee and with grievance procedure has been that the Florida Bar
and its grievance members are militant and diligent in their protection of the bar and of the public. I think that fact does get lost in
the conversation.
I also have, as a practicing attorney, seen grievances and complaints against my fellow lawyers. I think that in the bar generally
there is a tendency not to make waves against theirfraternity brothers which I regret. However, once that wave is started the grievance
committee does function well.
Second, my question. As to an independent Board of Review,
Board of Control, or Board of Supervisors and staff, I question if the
panel has given any thought to the economics and logistics of that
kind of board. From my experience the staff would be phenomenal
and the expense staggering. Lawyers already charge too much and
the cost of legal services would escalate.If somebody has a different
view I would like to hear it.
On the question of the legal profession being controlled by outsiders, I submit, and ask if you agree, that the law profession is
different than any other profession. We are a part of the judiciary.
We are part of the concept of separationof powers under our constitutional precept. As such it would in my opinion be exceedingly
dangerous, if not unconstitutional, for a legislative committee,
board, or agency, to undertake to control, regulate, and supervise
the functions of the bar. We are officers of the court and responsible
to the court, which is the judicial branch of our government. That
is where the responsibility lies and should lie.
MR. ATKINS:

If the independent board which you refer to in

your question is one I commented on in passing earlier, the answer
is yes, thought has been given to it. For the 1975-76 administrative
year of the Florida Bar, not counting the value of the time of the
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lawyers who serve on grievance committees or as referees or as bar
counsel, there is approximately $280,000 in the budget.
MR. LEVIN: I have one final question to ask Mr. Arkin. Stock
exchanges have on occasion been liable for damages resulting from
a broker who should have been disciplined by the stock exchange
but was not, and went on to injure his client. If we allow attorneys
to regulate themselves, and an attorney who should be disciplined
but is not, goes on to injure a client, do you think that bar associations should similarly be held liable for the injuries which ensue?
MR. ARKIN: I do believe we ought to have client indemnity
funds, and I think the funds should be the initial recourse of the
offended client, with the fund having a claim over subrogation
against the lawyer.

